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The use of tax havens by multinationals is a pervasive activity in international 
business. However, we know little about the complementary relationship between 
tax haven use and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the developing world. Drawing 
on internalization theory, we develop a conceptual framework that explores this 
relationship and allows us to contribute to the literature on the determinants of tax 
haven use by developed-country multinationals. Using a large, firm-level data set, 
we test the model and find a strong positive association between tax haven use 
and FDI into countries characterized by low economic development and extreme 
levels of capital flight. This paper contributes to the literature by adding an important 
dimension to our understanding of the motives for which MNEs invest in tax havens 
and has important policy implications at both the domestic and the international 
level.
Keywords: capital flight, economic development, institutions, tax havens, wealth 
extraction
1. Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from the developed world own different types of 
subsidiaries in increasingly complex networks across the globe. Some of the foreign 
host locations are characterized by light-touch regulation and secrecy, as well as low 
tax rates on financial capital. These so-called tax havens have received widespread 
media attention in recent years. In this paper, we explore the relationship between 
tax haven use and foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries, which 
are often characterized by weak institutions, market imperfections and a propensity 
for significant capital flight. This relationship is of critical importance because tax 
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havens are increasingly being characterized as wealth extractors that undermine 
economic development and contribute to rising inequality in developed nations 
(Torslov, Wier and Zucman, 2018). 
Recent research has begun to shed light on this phenomenon. Andersen et al. 
(2017) show that 15 per cent of the windfall gains in petroleum-producing countries 
with autocratic rulers is diverted to accounts in tax havens. A recent World Bank 
report (Andersen, Johannesen and Rijkers, 2020) shows that aid disbursements 
to highly aid-dependent countries are strongly associated with an increase in bank 
deposits to tax havens. Coupled with the disclosures in the Panama Papers, the 
Paradise Papers and the Luanda Leaks (Ndikumana, 2020), this research shows a 
clear pattern of abuse by elites in the developing world to amass wealth by using 
tax havens. Indeed, Ndikumana (2020) argues that capital flight has had a negative 
impact on the citizens of developing countries in Africa, depriving governments of 
the resources to invest in public services such as education, clean drinking water, 
health care, childcare services and sanitation systems.
The use of tax havens by the world’s leading MNEs is not a new phenomenon. 
Tax havens serve as financial hubs that handle enormous amounts of capital and 
trade. In conjunction with the world’s leading financial centres – London, New 
York, Frankfurt and Tokyo – they have become the nerve centres of global trading 
networks and a permanent feature of international business. A significant share of 
all MNEs own tax haven subsidiaries or, in some cases, are owned by parent MNEs 
that are registered in tax havens. These countries offer low tax rates or beneficial 
fiscal treatment of cross-border financial transactions, extensive bilateral investment 
and double taxation treaty networks, and access to international financial markets, 
which make them attractive to companies, large and small (UNCTAD, 2016). 
Enormous amounts of capital flow in and out of tax havens each year. The UNCTAD 
World Investment Reports of 2013 and 2016 report detailed FDI trends and amounts 
of investments to offshore financial centres by so-called special purpose entities, 
which are foreign subsidiaries created with the purpose of exploiting tax benefits in 
countries that offer low or zero corporate taxation. UNCTAD (2013, 2016) clearly 
shows how offshore financial centres account for an increasing share of global FDI 
flows emanating from important investor developed countries.
Zucman (2013) also finds significant flows and estimates that close to 40 per cent 
of the world’s FDI is routed through tax havens. Almost exclusively, this type of 
investment is not used for productive economic activity in the tax haven location. 
Instead, it is held there to avoid corporate tax levied at higher rates in countries 
across an MNE’s global network. Consequently, it deprives locations that create the 
economic value added of revenues that could be used to finance public investment, 
and it may increase taxes on less mobile forms of income, such as wages and 
salaries paid to workers.
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Using panel data for a sample of MNEs from 19 developed economies, we find 
that MNEs that have subsidiaries in developing countries with a high degree of 
capital flight also have a much stronger propensity to own tax haven subsidiaries 
than other MNEs who have only conventional subsidiaries in developed economies. 
This suggests that when MNEs extend their networks to regions of the world 
characterized by weak institutions and a high degree of capital flight, this leads to 
more tax haven activity. For example, in one of our specifications, we show that 
developed-country MNEs that own a subsidiary in Africa are 5 per cent more likely 
to own a tax haven subsidiary in a highly secretive location. 
This is an important finding and contributes to the literature both conceptually 
and empirically. First, our findings extend our conceptual understanding of 
how institutional voids affect developing countries. Buckley et al. (2015) apply 
internalization theory and the economic geography of FDI to tax havens and 
offshore financial centres with a particular emphasis on Chinese MNEs. They 
argue that capital market imperfections and poor institutional environments create 
significant transaction costs that can be alleviated by the use of tax havens. Our 
findings test this theory but extend the model to a specific phenomenon – countries 
that experience significant capital flight.
Our empirical contribution lies in the large panel data set that allows us to test the 
relationship between MNEs from 19 developed countries and their FDI locations 
around the world, including tax havens. This enables us to undertake a cross-
country comparison that is rare in the literature on tax havens, which mostly focuses 
on single-country analysis. We also contribute to the literature by drawing out a 
number of policy recommendations based on our main empirical results.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows: in the second section we outline our 
conceptual framework and generate two testable hypotheses. In the third section 
we describe the firm-level data used in this study. The fourth section lays out the 
empirical methodology and in the fifth section we report our results. The sixth 
section concludes with a discussion of our findings and policy implications.
2. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
Our conceptual framework is illustrated in figure 1, which shows the complementary 
relationship between investing in tax havens and investing in overseas non-tax-
haven subsidiaries. The framework draws on the traditional internalization theory 
(see Rugman, 1980, 2010) and combines with it insights from the work by Buckley 
et al. (2015), who apply internalization theory to offshore FDI with respect to Chinese 
capital flows. We build and extend the framework of Buckley et al. (2015), which 
uses a case-based empirical approach, by developing a conceptual framework 
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that enables us to generate testable hypotheses that can be estimated with firm-
level data using panel data. The benefit of this larger-scale empirical analysis lies 
in capturing cross-country evidence for a set of heterogeneous developed-country 
MNEs that have subsidiary structures across the world.
The profit-shifting activity of MNEs is a complex process (Holtzblatt, Jermakowicz 
and Epstein, 2015; Pun, 2017). MNEs that choose to undertake this type of 
activity need to employ well-qualified legal advisors, accountants and tax experts 
to take advantage of hybrid mismatch opportunities that result from differences in 
tax codes across countries (Kemme, Parikh and Steigner, 2017; OECD, 2013). In 
general, tax avoidance schemes are not difficult for MNEs to set up but do carry 
risks. Nevertheless, a number of firms are willing to supply firms with these types 
of schemes, Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca being a famous example. 
Furthermore, many enablers of tax avoidance, such as the Big Four, are ready to 
meet the demands of MNEs to undertake this type of activity (see Jones, Temouri 
and Cobham, 2018; Sikka, 2015; Sikka and Willmott, 2010). This can be observed 
from the recent Panama Papers and Paradise Papers scandals, which generated 
widespread media attention across the world.
At present, countries across the world are signatories to more than 3,000 bilateral 
international tax treaties. Hence, the tax landscape is constantly changing (Kleist, 
2018), and this complexity allows MNEs to use transfer pricing techniques to shift 
profits out of high-tax jurisdictions and into low-tax jurisdictions (Eden, 1998; Eden 
and Kudrle, 2005).1 Some argue that the ability of MNEs to exploit differences in 
corporate tax rules across the jurisdictions in which they operate is a key competitive 
advantage over firms that choose not to take such extreme measures (Picciotto, 
2018). 
Abstracting from the complexity of the structures used to undertake international 
profit shifting, figure 1 shows a simple tax avoidance structure. This basic structure 
is useful because it can encompass the various motivations for MNEs to use tax 
haven subsidiaries. In order to simplify the theory, we subsume all of these factors 
under a simple construct: “profit shifting”. 
Figure 1 shows three boxes. In the first box is the parent MNE, which originates from 
a developed country. In the second box is the tax haven subsidiary, which is located 
in an offshore jurisdiction that fits the parent MNE’s specific needs. The literature 
1 It is important to note that this type of activity is not necessarily illegal. In some circumstances, 
transfer pricing is needed in order to evaluate the performance of divisions across an MNE’s 
corporate structure. But very often it is abused for tax and secrecy purposes, and many scholars and 
representatives of non-governmental organizations believe it does not play to the spirit and intention 
of the rules as they have been developed since the 1920s. Indeed, some scholars argue that it 
undermines the undoubted ability of capitalism to enhance living standards across the world (Palan, 
Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2014). 
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suggests that MNEs do not choose a tax haven location in a vacuum (Dharmapala 
and Hines, 2009). Offshore locations differ in terms of geographical proximity 
and cultural ties to centres of large economic activity, quality of governance and 
institutions, and size of local populations, among other factors (Dharmapala and 
Hines, 2009). Nevertheless, one common aspect of tax haven locations is that they 
have institutions in place that protect the interests of investors. These include a 
stable political environment, a legal system that aligns with the interests of private 
property, privacy and high levels of secrecy for investors, light-touch regulation and 
low, often zero, rates of tax on corporate profits. 
The third box includes the parent firm’s set of conventional (non-tax-haven) 
subsidiaries. Any number of such subsidiaries could be included in this box, from 
any location across the world (except a tax haven). We assume that the parent has 
a significant degree of control over these subsidiaries, but it is not necessary to 
assume that they are fully owned.
Set of parent-owned, foreign 
non-tax-haven subsidiaries
Figure 1: Conceptual framework
Key:
a: Real resource ows
b & d: Shadow resource ows
c: Prot shifting
Degree of market imperfection and institutional weakness
Parent MNE located
in developed economy
Box 1
Fully-owned tax 
haven subsidiary
Box 3
y
xa
b
c
d
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The simple profit-shifting structure illustrated in figure 1 can be described as follows. 
The parent MNE sets up subsidiaries in foreign markets to mitigate transaction costs. 
This type of FDI is based on the four standard FDI motives (Dunning, 1980, 1988): 
(1) market-seeking; (2) resources-seeking; (3) efficiency-seeking; and (4) strategic 
asset-seeking. Hence, real resources flow back and forth from the subsidiaries to 
the parent; they could include knowledge transfers, intangible assets and capital 
goods. They are illustrated by capital flow a in figure 1, which is equal to the net 
flow of capital to and from the parent. At some stage in the MNE’s life cycle, the 
MNE may choose to take advantage of the financial benefits of setting up a tax 
haven subsidiary. This could be prior to the conventional investment overseas or it 
could be at a later date. Once the tax haven subsidiary has been set up, flows that 
we call “shadow resource flows” can be shifted between the tax haven subsidiary 
and the conventional overseas subsidiaries. These flows can be seen in shadow 
resource flows b and d in figure 1. Furthermore (not shown in the figure), the returns 
from these flows may end up back in the parent firm’s location of origin if the tax 
rules change, for example, through a repatriation tax holiday or a loosening of the 
domestic corporate tax rate (Bloink, 2011; Kyj and Romeo, 2015). An example of 
a shadow resource flow could be the use of an intangible asset such as intellectual 
property, such as a brand, patent or unique business process. Ownership of the 
intangible is registered in the tax haven, and the conventional subsidiary has to 
pay a royalty fee to use the intellectual property. Hence, profits are shifted from the 
conventional subsidiary in the high-tax location into the tax haven subsidiary in the 
low-tax location. This is shown by capital flow c in figure 1, which is equal to the 
sum of all the profit shifting from each of the conventional subsidiaries.2 
So how does this simple profit-shifting structure relate to the key research question 
of this paper? The answer lies in the complementary relationship between use of 
tax haven subsidiaries and investment in overseas non-tax-haven subsidiaries that 
are owned in order to conduct conventional FDI. In figure 1, the arrow at the top 
of the figure shows the degree of market imperfection and institutional weakness 
as posited by Buckley et al. (2015). As we move to the right, this degree increases 
as market imperfections and institutional weakness increase, and MNEs become 
more likely to undertake FDI with a physical presence as opposed to running 
joint ventures, licensing or exporting (Puck, Holtbrugge and Mohr, 2009) and also 
more likely to use tax havens. For example, the domestic capital market in the 
host location may not be driven by market forces, as MNEs may receive privileged 
2 A classic example of this type of structure is that of Starbucks. In 2012 it was revealed that although 
Starbucks had sales worth £1.2 billion in the United Kingdom in the three years preceding 2012, 
the company paid zero corporate income tax, as they reported zero profits. This was made possible 
by using practices such as transfer pricing, by registering patents with a subsidiary in a low-tax 
jurisdiction outside of the United Kingdom and then paying royalty payments to it, and by paying 
interest on loans – basically through a robust profit-shifting structure (Campbell and Helleloid, 2016).
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access through political connections or a business group that receives favourable 
access, or they may find it difficult to obtain bank loans because of complex 
and discriminatory regulations. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the second 
box contains a continuum of (non-tax haven) foreign subsidiaries, controlled by 
the parent and ranked in terms of the degree of market imperfections relative to 
the MNE’s home environment. For instance, a United Kingdom MNE may own a 
conventional overseas subsidiary in Poland, represented by position x in box 2, 
and a conventional overseas subsidiary in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
represented by position y at the far right side of box 2, where we assume that the 
degree of market imperfection and institutional weakness is such that y > x. MNEs 
are more likely to own tax havens if they have FDI in developing economies with 
significant market imperfections. This means that capital flows c and d between the 
conventional subsidiaries and the tax haven will be much stronger from location y 
than from location x3. This leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: MNEs that control foreign subsidiaries in developing economies 
with weak institutions and greater market imperfections have a higher likelihood of 
owning a tax haven subsidiary relative to MNEs who control foreign subsidiaries 
only in developed economies.
Hypothesis 1 is a direct test of the internalization theory as outlined by Buckley 
et al. (2015). In order to extend this theory, we specifically focus on an important 
phenomenon that often affects developing countries – capital flight. This is an 
extreme form of market imperfection and reflects the institutional weakness of the 
domestic economy. It often occurs in response to an economic event such as a 
negative economic shock, lower confidence in a country’s ability to meet its debt 
obligations or a change in the tax and regulatory environment. Such events may 
lead to a depreciation in the value of a country’s currency. In such environments, 
there is a strong incentive for foreign investors and corrupt government officials to 
withdraw their money from the country; and using a tax haven, with its associated 
light-touch regulation and secrecy, enables MNEs and individuals to do this quickly 
and secretly. 
It is important to acknowledge that capital flight has many determinants and that 
it is not only about avoiding tax (see e.g. Alesina and Tabellini, 1989; Cuddington, 
1986; Lensink, Hermes and Murinde, 2000; Pastor, 1990). However, in terms 
of the empirical evidence, Bolwijn, Casella and Rigo (2018) have examined the 
link between profit-shifting activities of MNEs and FDI, with a focus on the use of 
offshore financial centres. Their analysis confirms that tax avoidance, enabled by FDI 
through offshore hubs, is responsible for an estimated $100 billion in annual losses 
3 This should be thought about in a relative sense with respect to the size of the market in question. 
For example, financial flow as a proportion of GDP. 
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for developing countries. Over recent decades, some of the weakest economies in 
the world – notably in sub-Saharan Africa – have experienced significant outflows of 
foreign capital into Western financial centres. Ndikumana and Boyce (2010; 2018) 
calculate capital flight for 30 sub-Saharan African countries from 1970 to 2015 and 
find that total capital flight amounted to $1.4 trillion over this period, far exceeding 
the stock of debt owed by these countries as of 2015 ($496.9 billion). They go on 
to point out that these countries lose more through capital flight than they receive 
in the form of foreign aid. Furthermore, they state that “promoting international 
cooperation to lift the veil of secrecy in offshore banking jurisdictions” (Ndikumana 
and Boyce, 2010: 478) would go a long way to curtail future capital flight. Hence, 
there seems to be a strong association between countries that experience significant 
capital flight and tax haven use. This observation leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of owning a tax haven subsidiary increases if an MNE 
controls subsidiaries in developing countries associated with a significant degree 
of capital flight.
3. Data
The primary source of data for this study is the ORBIS database published by 
Bureau van Dijk. ORBIS is a firm-level data set that contains published information 
on the accounts, financials, ownership and location of companies from all across 
the world. It also includes the number and location of all the subsidiaries owned by 
each firm. This is valuable as it allows us to map the operations of MNEs across the 
globe and to identify investments in locations classified as tax havens. The secrecy 
provisions in tax havens make it hard to trace subsidiaries or any companies 
incorporated there, not to mention their financial details. The geographical 
identification of subsidiaries provided by the data from ORBIS thus presents one of 
the best ways to shed light on this type of activity.
For the purpose of this study, the data set includes MNEs from the following 19 
developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Table 1 
shows the firm and country coverage. As can be seen, a large number of firms 
are included from Germany, Italy, France and Spain. An MNE is defined as a firm 
with at least a 50 per cent stake in a foreign enterprise. The data consist of an 
unbalanced panel for the years 2009 to 2017, and the data set consists of 149,244 
observations across 34,047 MNEs.
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Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. As can be 
seen, 12 per cent of the firms in our sample have a subsidiary in a “dot” tax haven, 
which includes only some of the small island economies, such as the Cayman 
Islands. In contrast, if we use a broader tax haven measure that includes the Big 
Seven, such as Hong Kong (China), then 35 per cent of the firms have a tax haven 
subsidiary. Other interesting statistics show that the average number of subsidiaries 
a firm has abroad is equal to 22.7. Furthermore, 30 per cent of the firms in the 
sample are classified as knowledge-intensive service providers and 5 per cent of 
the firms are in the high-technology manufacturing sector. In terms of firm financial 
statistics, the average turnover in natural logarithms is 11.42, which amounts to 
approximately $60 million. The descriptive statistics also show that approximately 
14 per cent of the parent firms own a subsidiary in Africa and 21 per cent of the 
firms own a subsidiary in South America.
Table 1. Distribution of MNEs by home country
Origin country Number of parent MNEs
Australia 516
Austria 1,160
Belgium 1,680
Canada 105
Denmark 701
Germany 4,126
Greece 214
Finland 899
France 4,129
Iceland 43
Italy 7,960
Japan 1,867
Netherlands 863
New Zealand 27
Norway 420
Portugal 832
Spain 3,956
Sweden 1,316
United Kingdom 1,850
United States 1,383
Total 34,047
Source:  ORBIS database.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation
Dot Tax Havens 149,244 0.123121 0.328577
Dot + EU NC 149,244 0.168369 0.374195
Dot + Big 7 149,244 0.341689 0.474277
Dot + EU NC + Big 7 149,244 0.35842 0.479538
Developed 149,244 0.82867 0.376799
Africa 149,244 0.146833 0.353941
East Asia 149,244 0.283911 0.450896
South and Central Asia 149,244 0.158519 0.365228
Europe 149,244 0.265572 0.441639
Middle East 149,244 0.052753 0.22354
North America 149,244 0.1296 0.335864
South America 149,244 0.211231 0.408184
Oceania 149,244 0.008724 0.092994
Capital Flight Top 10 149,244 0.390569 0.487879
Capital Flight Top 11-30 149,244 0.152917 0.359909
Capital Flight Top 31-50 149,244 0.211841 0.408614
Rest of Africa 149,244 0.074589 0.262728
Rest of the World 149,244 0.158894 0.365579
Above 10% GDP 149,244 0.136019 0.34281
5% to 10% GDP 149,244 0.289693 0.453622
2% to 5% GDP 149,244 0.370326 0.482894
Below 2% GDP 149,244 0.229704 0.420644
Knowledge-Intensive Services 149,244 0.309996 0.462493
Less-Knowledge-Intensive Services 149,244 0.252553 0.434478
High-Tech Manufacturing 149,244 0.052109 0.222248
Medium-High-Tech 149,244 0.158097 0.364833
Medium-Low-Tech 149,244 0.112681 0.316204
Low-Tech 149,244 0.114564 0.318496
Ln Intangible Fixed Assets 149,244 7.416115 3.645311
Ln Long-Term Debt 149,244 8.971327 2.875317
Ln Cash Flow 149,244 8.753994 2.415796
Ln Turnover 149,244 11.42334 2.269039
Number of Foreign Subsidiaries 149,244 22.70761 70.9598
Source:  see Sections 3.1 – 3.3
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3.1 Dependent variable
Defining which countries are classified as tax havens is not straightforward. In 
their book Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works, Palan et al. (2010, p. 8) 
define tax havens as “places or countries that have sufficient autonomy to write 
their own tax, finance, and other laws and regulations. They all take advantage 
of this autonomy to create legislation designed to assist non-resident persons or 
corporations to avoid the regulatory obligations imposed on them in the places 
where those non-resident people or corporations undertake the substance of their 
economic transaction.”
Tax havens are, first and foremost, legal entities – countries, cities or states – that 
have the authority to make their own laws, specifically tax laws. These entities thus 
have legal control or jurisdiction over certain geographical areas that they use to 
offer individuals and corporations incentives for investment. The incentives come in 
a number of forms, the most significant of which are low tax rates on mobile capital 
and the provision of secrecy (Palan et al., 2010). 
The literature so far has focused much more attention on the low tax rates set by 
these jurisdictions and perhaps overlooked the secrecy provisions that tax havens 
can provide. Researchers who have taken a conservative approach in terms of 
defining tax havens include Hines and Rice (1994) and Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2006b), who identify “dot tax havens” as geographically small and isolated, often 
small island economies that thrive as financial hubs with little indigenous population 
or industry, such as the Cayman Islands, Andorra, Monaco and Seychelles. These 
stand in contrast to the Big Seven havens, which are identified as Hong Kong 
(China), Ireland, Switzerland, Liberia, Lebanon, Singapore and Panama. The Big 
Seven all have populations in excess of two million inhabitants and significant 
indigenous economic activity. In this paper we take advantage of both of these 
definitions. Furthermore, we also use the European Union (EU) blacklist of non-
cooperative jurisdictions (European Council, 2917; 2019). Table 3 outlines which 
countries are classified as tax havens across these three categorizations. The dot 
tax havens are taken from Jones and Temouri (2016), which has greater coverage 
than Hines and Rice (1994); the EU non-cooperative jurisdictions are from the EU 
and the Big Seven are from Hines and Rice (1994).
Once a tax haven location is defined, it is then possible to determine whether an 
MNE owns a tax haven subsidiary by using the ownership information in ORBIS. 
Hence, we are able to construct our dependent variable, which equals 1 if a firm 
owns a tax haven subsidiary and 0 otherwise. We create three tax haven measures 
to ensure robustness across each specification. The first measure equals 1 if 
a firm owns a subsidiary in a dot tax haven and 0 otherwise. This is therefore 
the narrowest definition. The other definitions become much broader in terms of 
coverage. The second tax haven measure equals 1 if a firm owns a dot tax haven 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 27, 2020, Number 212
Table 3. Tax haven definitions
Jones and Temouri (2016), dot 
tax havens
EU, non-cooperative 
jurisdictions
Hines and Rice (1994), Big 7
Andorra Bahrain Hong Kong (China)
Anguilla Barbados Ireland
Antigua Belize Lebanon
Barbados Grenada Liberia
Bahrain Guam Panama
Bermuda Macao (China) Singapore
Bahamas Marshall Islands Switzerland
Belize Mongolia
British Virgin Islands Namibia
Cayman Islands Palau
Cook Islands Panama
Cyprus Saint Lucia
Isle of Man Samoa
Jersey Trinidad & Tobago
Gibraltar Tunisia
Grenada United Arab Emirates
Guernsey
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Macao (China)
Malta
Monaco
Netherlands Antilles
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent
Seychelles
Turks and Caicos Islands
subsidiary and owns a subsidiary from the EU blacklist and 0 otherwise. The third 
measure combines all three categories; it equals 1 if a firm owns a subsidiary in a 
dot tax haven, an EU-blacklisted haven or one of the Big Seven and 0 otherwise. 
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3.2 Independent variables
In order to test our two hypotheses, we created a set of dummy variables. First, 
we had to identify the location of non-tax haven subsidiaries in order to create 
regional dummies. ORBIS provides the ownership information needed to do this. 
Consequently, we can create a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a subsidiary 
in the developed world and 0 if it does not. Table 2 shows that 82 per cent of parent 
MNEs own a subsidiary in the developed world. This is not surprising because our 
sample consists of parent firms from the developed world. In a similar way, we 
also created dummies for Africa, East Asia, South and Central Asia, Europe, the 
Middle East, North America, South America and Oceania. It is important to note 
that these dummies are not mutually exclusive. In order to classify countries as 
developed or developing, we used the United Nations World Economic Situation 
and Prospects (WESP) report for 2014 (United Nations, 2014). The 2014 WESP 
country classifications reflect the basic economic conditions in a country and serve 
as a reliable marker of development for the time period used in this research. Table 
4 identifies which region each country belongs to.
To test for capital flight, we used data from Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a non-
profit Washington, DC-based research and advisory organization working on the 
analysis of illicit financial flows. GFI releases data as well as periodic reports for 
what it regards as “illicit financial flows” from the developing world. This paper 
makes use of the data from two GFI reports: Illicit Financial Flows from Developing 
Countries: 2004–2013 (Kar and Spanjers, 2015) and Illicit Financial Flows to and 
from Developing Countries: 2005–2014 (Global Financial Integrity, 2014). Their 
calculations put the total unrecorded capital flight from the developing world over 
the 10-year period (2004–2013) at roughly $7.8 trillion. This paper uses the GFI 
data to form a ranking of average annual unreported capital flight from developing 
countries. The countries are then divided into three groups: (1) “extreme capital 
flight” includes the top 10 countries by average amount of capital flight; (2) “large 
capital flight” refers to the next 20 countries by average amount of capital flight; 
and (3) “medium capital flight” refers to the next 20 countries by average amount 
of capital flight. We then created a set of dummy variables for each of the three 
categories. These are shown in table 5.
Last, as a final robustness check, we also created four dummy variables for capital 
flight as a percentage of GDP: (1) capital flight greater than 10 per cent of GDP; (2) 
capital flight between 5 and 10 per cent of GDP; (3) capital flight between 2 and 
5 per cent of GDP; and (4) capital flight below 2 per cent of GDP. It is important 
to note that these dummies are calculated for countries that are not developed 
countries. For a detailed list of countries in each category, see table 6.
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Table 5. List of countries by unrecorded capital outflows (Top 50)
Extreme capital flight (Top 10) Large capital flight (Top 11-30) Medium capital flight  
(Top 31-50)
China Kazakhstan Oman
Russian Federation Turkey Peru
Mexico Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of Morocco
India Ukraine Serbia
Malaysia Costa Rica Egypt
Brazil Iraq Paraguay
South Africa Azerbaijan Trinidad and Tobago
Thailand Viet Nam Romania
Indonesia Philippines Nicaragua
Nigeria Poland Zambia
Belarus Saudi Arabia
Aruba Kuwait
Argentina Ecuador
Iran, Islamic Rep. of Ethiopia
Hungary Bulgaria
Bangladesh Côte d'Ivoire
Brunei Darussalam Togo
Syria Guatemala
Qatar Equatorial Guinea
Honduras Sri Lanka
Source:  Global Financial Integrity.
Table 6. Capital flight as a percentage of GDP by country
Above 10% 5%–10% 2%–5% Below 2%
Armenia Bangladesh Benin Afghanistan
Aruba Bulgaria Bhutan Albania
Azerbaijan Burkina Faso Bolivia Algeria
Belarus Croatia Burundi Angola
Botswana El Salvador Cabo Verde Argentina
Brunei Darussalam Ethiopia Cameroon Bosnia & Herzegovina
Cambodia Fiji China Brazil
Chad Guatemala Dominican Rep. Central African Rep. 
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Table 6. Capital flight as a percentage of GDP by country (Concluded)
Above 10% 5%–10% 2%–5% Below 2%
Comoros Guinea Ecuador Colombia
Congo-Brazzaville Guinea-Bissau Egypt Congo-Kinshasa
Costa Rica Iraq Gabon Dominica
Côte d'Ivoire Jordan Haiti Eritrea
Djibouti Lebanon Hungary Ghana
Equatorial Guinea Macedonia India Iran
Georgia Madagascar Indonesia Kenya
The Gambia Maldives Jamaica Libya
Guyana Mali Kiribati Mauritania
Honduras Mauritius Kuwait Myanmar
Kazakhstan Mexico Kyrgyzstan Pakistan
Laos Montenegro Mongolia Saudi Arabia
Lesotho Nigeria Morocco Tajikistan
Liberia Oman Mozambique Tanzania
Malawi Panama Nepal Timor-Leste
Malaysia Papua New Guinea Niger Turkmenistan
Moldova Philippines Peru Yemen
Namibia Russia Qatar  
Nicaragua Rwanda Romania  
Paraguay Sao Tome Sri Lanka  
Samoa Senegal Sudan  
Serbia South Africa Tonga  
Sierra Leone Thailand Tunisia  
Solomon Islands Ukraine Turkey  
Suriname Venezuela Uganda  
Swaziland Vietnam Uruguay  
Syria  Zimbabwe  
Togo    
Trinidad and Tobago    
Vanuatu    
Zambia    
 Source: Global Financial Integrity.
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 27, 2020, Number 218
3.3 Control variables
The literature identifies a number of variables that can explain the determinants of tax 
haven use. Taylor, Richardson and Taplin (2015) use data on 200 Australian firms. 
They find that intangible assets, withholding taxes and the degree of multinationality 
have significant explanatory power. Graham and Tucker (2006) relate firm size and 
profitability to the use of tax havens. Desai, Foley and Hines (2006a) focus on United 
States MNEs and find that firms with large research and development operations 
are more likely to use tax haven affiliates whereas intrafirm trade exhibits a positive 
relationship with tax haven usage. 
With these studies as guidelines, the yearly financial accounts provided by ORBIS 
provide us with these control variables, such as turnover and the number of foreign 
subsidiaries, to capture firm size and internationalization. We also control for 
intangible fixed assets and long-term debt. It is important to point out that these 
data are for the parent MNE only and not the foreign subsidiaries. We also use the 
NACE two-digit industry codes to create broad sector-level fixed effects, in order to 
capture the effect of industry and technology-intensity differences. The categories 
are based on a definition from Eurostat and are as follows: high-technology 
manufacturing, medium-high-technology manufacturing, medium-low-technology 
manufacturing, low-technology manufacturing, knowledge-intensive services and 
less-knowledge-intensive services. 
4. Empirical method
The empirical model used in this paper adapts the model used by Jones and 
Temouri (2016), who investigate the determinants of tax haven FDI. Thus, the 
data lend themselves to an econometric analysis using a probit model, which 
is consistent with studies undertaken in the literature. For this study we used a 
number of variants of the following model to test our hypotheses:
TAX HAVENitc = β0 + Ω FSAitc +  REGIONitc + δ1 FLIGHTitc + Sk + Pt + ɛitc (1) 
where subscript i represents each individual MNE, t represents the year, c represents 
the parent MNE’s country of incorporation and k represents sectors. The dependent 
variable TAX HAVEN refers to the dependent variable that takes the value of 1 if 
an MNE owns a subsidiary located in a tax haven and 0 otherwise. The vector FSA 
contains firm-specific variables that are typically found in the literature (see Graham 
and Tucker, 2006; Jones and Temouri, 2016). These include turnover, to account 
for firm size; intangible fixed assets, as these can be manipulated by transfer pricing 
in order to shift profits; the number of non-tax haven subsidiaries owned by the 
developed-country MNE, to control for the degree of internationalization; the MNE’s 
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long-term debt, given the ability of firms to use thin capitalization to manipulate 
profits; and cash flow, as a short-term performance measure. 
In order to test our hypotheses, we include variables called REGION and FLIGHT. 
The j = 9 REGION variables are set up as follows: when j = 1 the dummy variable 
is called “Developed”. It equals 1 if a parent MNE has control of a subsidiary in the 
developed world (not including a domestic subsidiary) and 0 otherwise. When j = 
2, the dummy variable is called Africa. This equals 1 if a parent MNE has control of 
a subsidiary in Africa and 0 otherwise. This continues for j = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
The other locations are East Asia, South and Central Asia, Rest of Europe, Middle 
East, North America, South America and Oceania. It is important to note that the 
dummy variables are not mutually exclusive. 
The variable FLIGHT is a measure of capital flight and this is operationalized in 
two ways. First, we rank countries in terms of the volume of capital flight. We then 
create three dummy variables as outlined above and shown in tables 5 and 6. 
Capital Flight Top 10 is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm owns a subsidiary abroad 
that is in the top 10 countries in terms of capital flight and 0 otherwise. Capital Flight 
Top 11-30 is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm owns a subsidiary abroad that is in 
the 11-30 ranking in terms of capital flight and 0 otherwise. Capital Flight Top 31-50 
is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm owns a subsidiary abroad that is in the 31-50 
ranking in terms of capital flight and 0 otherwise. Countries outside the top 50 are 
in the base category to measure against. For the second approach, developing 
countries are classified by ranking unrecorded capital outflows as a percentage of 
their GDP. Dummy variables record the presence of subsidiaries in countries where 
unrecorded capital outflows account for (1) above 10 per cent of GDP; (2) between 
5 and 10 per cent of GDP; (3) between 2 and 5 per cent of GDP; and (4) below 2 
per cent of GDP. 
5. Results
Our empirical results (marginal effects) are shown in tables 7, 8 and 9. Each table has 
three columns within it corresponding to different tax haven dependent variables, 
starting with the narrowest definition of a tax haven and finishing with the broadest 
definition. Table 7 investigates hypothesis 1, whereas tables 8 and 9 investigate the 
impact of capital flight and hence test hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that parent firms that own subsidiaries in the developing 
world have a greater propensity to use tax havens. This is operationalized by 
including dummy variables for a specific region where a parent owns subsidiaries. 
As can be seen for each tax haven measure in columns 1 to 3 of table 7, parent 
firms that own a subsidiary in a developed country are much less likely to own a tax 
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haven subsidiary than those that do not own a subsidiary in a developed country. 
The magnitude of this effect gets larger as the tax haven measure shifts from the 
narrow definition to the broad definition. Hence, this represents the first part of the 
evidence that MNEs that own subsidiaries only in the developed world are less 
likely to use tax havens.
The other regional dummies are of even greater interest and specifically test 
hypothesis 1. The dummy variable for Africa is positive and significant. Using the 
narrowest definition of a tax haven, it would appear that parent firms that own a 
subsidiary in Africa have a 5.3 per cent greater probability of using a tax haven 
than do firms that do not own a tax haven subsidiary. Interestingly, the magnitude 
increases to 11.4 per cent when the measure for tax havens includes the jurisdictions 
blacklisted by the EU but falls when using the broadest measure of tax havens in 
column 3. This suggests that the ownership of subsidiaries in Africa is strongly 
correlated with the most secretive tax haven locations – the dot tax havens and 
the tax havens identified by the EU as being the most non-cooperative in terms of 
transparency.
Similar evidence can be seen for the other regional dummy variables for developing 
countries, but the magnitude of the effect across the tax haven measures is not 
quite as large as for Africa. One exception to this is the ownership of subsidiaries 
in Oceania. However, this can perhaps be explained as an outlier, as subsidiary 
ownership in this region constitutes a very small part of the sample and these 
locations themselves are tiny island economies, arguably working as auxiliaries 
to neighbouring havens. In summary, therefore, our results indicate quite strong 
support for hypothesis 1 in that it appears that subsidiary ownership in developing 
countries, which are characterized by market imperfections and weaker institutions, 
is strongly correlated with the ownership of tax haven subsidiaries.
Table 7. Developed versus developing countries
Variable (1)
Dot tax havens
(2)
Dot + EU non-
cooperative
(3)
Dot + EU non-
cooperative + Big 7
Developed -0.0462*** -0.0985*** -0.214***
(0.00272) (0.00356) (0.00399)
Africa 0.0526*** 0.114*** 0.0283***
(0.00266) (0.00384) (0.00612)
East Asia 0.00660*** 0.0153*** 0.160***
(0.00189) (0.00258) (0.00478)
South and Central Asia 0.0165*** 0.0335*** 0.101***
(0.00248) (0.00341) (0.00573)
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Table 7. Developed versus developing countries (Concluded)
Variable (1)
Dot tax havens
(2)
Dot + EU non-
cooperative
(3)
Dot + EU non-
cooperative + Big 7
Rest of Europe 0.0297*** 0.0307*** -0.0667***
(0.00191) (0.00251) (0.00511)
Middle East 0.0464*** 0.186*** 0.0673***
(0.00439) (0.0118) (0.0183)
North America 0.00955*** 0.0520*** -0.0199***
(0.00251) (0.00380) (0.00666)
South America -0.00208 0.0240*** -0.0166***
(0.00198) (0.00281) (0.00499)
Oceania 0.134*** 0.177*** 0.167***
(0.0142) (0.0230) (0.0361)
Log Intangible Fixed Assets 0.00599*** 0.00715*** 0.0150***
(0.000366) (0.000469) (0.000738)
Log Long-Term Debt 0.00537*** 0.00605*** -0.00350***
(0.000427) (0.000545) (0.000820)
Log Cash Flow 0.0134*** 0.0126*** 0.0253***
(0.000758) (0.000976) (0.00155)
Log Turnover -0.00639*** -0.00620*** 0.0148***
(0.000739) (0.000982) (0.00163)
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.000900*** 0.00179*** 0.0145***
(2.99e-05) (7.91e-05) (0.000500)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -38498.267 -46785.146 -66734.513
Wald chi² 18103.43 19009.21 20606.02
Prob > chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.3086 0.3084 0.3147
Observations 149,244 149,244 149,244
Note: Each column reports the marginal effects from a set of probit regressions. The dependent variable is whether a firm owns a 
subsidiary in a tax haven, based on three definitions. Period dummies, the constant and the fixed effect coefficients are not reported 
for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible assets are entered as their natural logarithms. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Hypothesis 2 focuses on capital flight as an important determinant of tax haven use, 
the argument being that developed-country MNEs that own tax haven subsidiaries 
in developing countries and that are characterized by significant capital flight are 
much more likely to use tax havens. The results for this prediction are shown in 
tables 8 and 9, which use capital flight measures based on the absolute value of 
capital flight and as a percentage of GDP.
The developed-country dummy across each specification in columns 4 to 9 is 
again negative and significant, mirroring the results reported in table 7. In contrast, 
the dummies for capital flight (using the two methods) are positive and provide 
strong support for hypothesis 2. What is also interesting is that stronger results are 
obtained when using the broader measure of tax haven use. This suggests that 
parent firms that own subsidiaries in countries with a high degree of capital flight 
are also likely to own tax haven subsidiaries in the most secretive locations as well 
as the bigger tax haven locations. This is consistent with the argument that financial 
flows are channelled throughout the financial system and into and out of the most 
secretive dot tax havens and in turn channelled to the bigger financial centres. 
Last, it is important to discuss the control variables used in each model. For 
each specification, the coefficient on tax haven use is strongly correlated with the 
ownership of intangible assets, consistent with the literature (Taylor et al., 2015). 
There is also significant evidence that firms that own more foreign subsidiaries, 
which proxies for the degree of internationalization, are also much more likely to 
own tax haven subsidiaries. Furthermore, firms that have a healthy cash flow are 
also much more likely to use tax havens, which means that tax haven use appears 
to be correlated with firm performance, especially in the short term. The results 
for turnover show that turnover is a positive predictor of tax haven use for the 
broader tax haven measure but a negative predictor for the narrower tax haven 
measure. This flips around for results obtained for long-term debt, such that more 
indebtedness correlates positively for MNEs who own subsidiaries in some of the 
most secretive tax haven locations.
The relationship between MNE tax haven use and FDI  
into developing economies characterized by capital flight 23
Table 8. Unrecorded capital outflows (absolute) 
Variable (5)
Dot tax havens
(6)
Dot + EU non-
cooperative
(7)
Dot + EU non-
cooperative + Big 7
Developed -0.0437*** -0.0915*** -0.220***
(0.00273) (0.00367) (0.00397)
Capital Flight Top 10 0.00258 0.0131*** 0.0501***
(0.00172) (0.00235) (0.00432)
Capital Flight Top 11-30 0.0190*** 0.0689*** 0.0558***
(0.00253) (0.00372) (0.00555)
Capital Flight Top 31-50 0.0422*** 0.0458*** -0.0777***
(0.00221) (0.00274) (0.00498)
Rest of Africa 0.0568*** 0.138*** -0.00436
(0.00369) (0.00678) (0.00964)
Rest of World 0.0163*** 0.0517*** 0.0390***
(0.00239) (0.00345) (0.00590)
Log Intangible Fixed Assets 0.00660*** 0.00840*** 0.0153***
(0.000370) (0.000473) (0.000734)
Log Long-Term Debt 0.00520*** 0.00616*** -0.00449***
(0.000428) (0.000545) (0.000808)
Log Cash Flow 0.0137*** 0.0133*** 0.0266***
(0.000765) (0.000984) (0.00154)
Log Turnover -0.00615*** -0.00674*** 0.0176***
(0.000749) (0.000987) (0.00163)
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.000978*** 0.00200*** 0.0152***
(3.19e-05) (8.50e-05) (0.000432)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -38753.666 -47242.826 -67488.619
Wald chi² 17488.32 18505.21 19307.05
Prob > chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.3040 0.3017 0.3070
Observations 149,244 149,244 149,244
Note: Each column reports the marginal effects from a set of probit regressions. The dependent variable is whether a firm owns a 
subsidiary in a tax haven, based on three definitions. Period dummies, the constant and the fixed effect coefficients are not reported 
for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible assets are entered as their natural logarithms. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 9. Unrecorded capital outflows (GDP, per cent) 
Variable (8)
Dot tax havens
(9)
Dot + EU non-
cooperative
(10)
Dot + EU non-
cooperative + Big 7
Developed -0.0456*** -0.0966*** -0.200***
(0.00276) (0.00361) (0.00426)
Above 10% GDP 0.0280*** 0.0511*** 0.130***
(0.00271) (0.00375) (0.00620)
5% to 10% GDP 0.0236*** 0.0390*** -0.00154
(0.00196) (0.00261) (0.00168)
2% to 5% GDP 0.0205*** 0.0370*** 0.104***
(0.00180) (0.00237) (0.00423)
Below 2% 0.00890*** 0.0452*** -0.0230***
(0.00193) (0.00272) (0.00487)
Log Intangible Fixed Assets 0.00647*** 0.00796*** 0.0162***
(0.000369) (0.000468) (0.000737)
Log Long-Term Debt 0.00534*** 0.00590*** -0.00467***
(0.000428) (0.000540) (0.000820)
Log Cash Flow 0.0129*** 0.0121*** 0.0276***
(0.000759) (0.000964) (0.00155)
Log Turnover -0.00702*** -0.00729*** 0.0169***
(0.000741) (0.000968) (0.00164)
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.00107*** 0.00212*** 0.0137***
(3.17e-05) (8.32e-05) (0.000516)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies -38990.868 -47684.474 -67297.497
Time Dummies 16880.33 18719.83 21200.32
Log Pseudo-Likelihood 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wald chi² 0.2998 0.2951 0.3089
Prob > chi² 149,244 149,244 149,244
Pseudo R² 0.3040 0.3017 0.3070
Observations 149,244 149,244 149,244
Note: Each column reports the marginal effects from a set of probit regressions. The dependent variable is whether a firm owns a 
subsidiary in a tax haven, based on three definitions. Period dummies, the constant and the fixed effect coefficients are not reported 
for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible assets are entered as their natural logarithms. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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6. Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this research we have learned that tax haven use is strongly correlated with 
developed-country MNEs owning subsidiaries in developing countries, often 
characterized by significant market imperfections and weak institutions. 
Furthermore, we showed that this relationship also holds for developed-country 
MNEs that own subsidiaries in locations that are characterized by significant capital 
flight. This is a particular type of market imperfection that has a significant impact 
on the developing world, as it removes wealth and income that could be used to 
finance public expenditure targeted at the poorest members of society. 
Our findings build upon the literature that investigates tax haven use (see review 
by Cooper and Nguyen, 2020) and directly tests the theoretical insights of Buckley 
et al. (2015) with respect to market imperfections, institutions and economic 
geography. Furthermore, our findings add insights to the literature that estimates 
the volume of profit shifting by MNEs (Cobham, Janský and Meinzer, 2015; 
Zucman, 2015; Zucman, Fagan and Piketty, 2016) and adds to our understanding 
of the complementary relationship between tax haven uses and investments into 
developing countries.
It is important to point out some weaknesses in our analysis that future research 
could address. First, our data set does not allow us to consider the actual financial 
flows that go into and out of tax havens. The ORBIS database only allows us to 
determine whether a developed-country MNE owns a subsidiary in a particular 
location. Very often the accounting data for these subsidiaries are incomplete and 
missing. If there were open and transparent financial reporting, country by country, 
then it would be possible to account for the degree of profit shifting into and out 
of tax havens and researchers could begin to understand the degree of asset 
ownership booked into tax havens. Recent evidence by Faccio and FitzGerald 
(2018) is important in showing a case-based study analysis of Vodafone, the first 
large MNE to voluntarily publish country-by-country data. Using Vodafone’s data, 
they show the tax impact of a move to formulary apportionment on a global basis 
versus the EU’s Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base proposal. 
Second, it is important to note that tax avoidance and capital flight are both 
products of a weak institutional environment (Cuddington, 1986; Lensink et al., 
2000). Indeed, capital flight is not motivated only by tax considerations (Alesina 
and Tabellini, 1989; Pastor, 1990). Future research could consider in greater detail 
other confounding factors that drive capital flight and tax avoidance in order to shed 
additional light on this important phenomenon.
In terms of policy, this research has a number of implications. First, developing 
countries must strengthen their rules with respect to beneficial ownership of 
companies, trusts, partnerships and foundations. Being better able to understand 
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who ultimately owns or has legal control of companies within their jurisdictions allows 
much greater oversight by the public and provides incentives to representatives to 
hold these companies and their owners to better account. It also enables better 
oversight and monitoring compliance and will enable countries to enact legislation 
to mitigate the degree of profit shifting that lowers the revenue losses. For example, 
it may better enable local content laws that make it possible for mineral rights to 
flow to indigenous groups. This would go some way to stop capital from being 
withdrawn from these countries. Indeed, policies such as these would help 
reinforce the power of development aid to boost economic development in these 
regions.  
Nevertheless, domestic policy is not sufficient to stop the profit shifting and wealth 
extraction out of developing countries. The international system of corporate 
taxation is in a state of flux. The old system based on the arms-length principle is in 
much need of reform. The rules were designed at a time when the role of the MNE 
in the world economy was much less important than it is today. Furthermore, the 
pervasiveness of digital MNEs and their ability to sell goods and services in markets 
without having a physical presence means that profit shifting is becoming even 
more pervasive. Casella and Formenti (2018) show evidence for this trend when 
they report that MNEs in more digital industries have less conventional FDI than less 
digitally-oriented MNEs and instead have higher incentives to invest in subsidiaries 
with fiscal and financial motives. 
The OECD’s 2012 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative has had some 
success with respect to acknowledging this issue and has emphasized much 
greater transparency with respect to country-by-country reporting, but it is essential 
that the international community work together to reform international taxation (for 
data and methodological issues with implementing BEPS, see Bradbury, Hanappi 
and Moore, 2018). Sadly, at the time of writing this paper, implementation of these 
reforms appears unlikely as the United States has withdrawn from the OECD/G20 
Inclusive Framework on BEPS. This framework brought together 135 countries 
and jurisdictions to collaborate on the 15 Actions that resulted from the BEPS 
initiative. It puts significant emphasis on trying to ensure that profits are taxed where 
economic activity and value creation occurs. Indeed, this may eventually lead to a 
system of unitary taxation and formulary apportionment that could go a long way 
towards eradicating profit shifting and mitigating the impact of tax havens. However, 
recently the United States and the EU Commission decided to depart from the 
OECD BEPS process. The use of digital sales taxes, enacted unilaterally by many 
countries, is undermining the multilateral framework, and it appears that developing 
countries are being marginalized from the process. Hence, it would appear that 
there is a long way to go in terms of reforming the international system of corporate 
taxation and eliminating the harmful tax practices that affect developing countries.
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